[转帖]中越战争---中立性文章

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中越战争
这篇文章的中立性有争议，内容、语调可能带有明显的个人观点或地方色彩。


中越战争是于1979年2月17日－1979年3月16日爆发在中国和越南之间的一场战争。中国称之为对越自卫还击战，在民间被习惯称作对越自卫反击战，越南称之为在北部边界打败侵略战争。在短暂侵入越南北部之后，中国军队在一个月之内撤出了越南。中方和越方都宣布取得了战争的胜利。这场战争使中、越两国关系进一步恶化到最低点，并使大量华裔越南人继续逃亡。


目录
1 起因
1.1 战争起因
2 中国的战前准备
3 战争过程
4 战争评述
5 后果
6 参看条目
7 外部链接


起因
战争起因
在与法国开战的第一次越南战争初期，中华人民共和国与越南民主共和国（北越）有着很紧密的关系。双方都反对在越南的统治者法国殖民政权。在战争期间，中国和苏联都向越南提供了援助，共同反对殖民主义者。
进入七十年代，冷战后期中国与苏联处于敌对状态，而中美关系则开始正常化。1978年6月29日，越南加入苏联为首的经济互助委员会COMECON。苏联出于牵制中国的目的，1978年11月3日与越南签订了带有军事援助性质的《苏越友好合作条约》，支持越南在印度支那半岛的扩张。越南在苏联的默许下，为了阻止红色高棉对越南侨民的大屠杀入侵了中国的盟友之一民主柬埔寨，并推翻了毛泽东主义的红色高棉政权。同时中国认为越南在国内大规模“排华”；越南方对中越边境的陆地、海洋提出主权要求，宣布将西沙群岛、南沙群岛等岛屿纳入其版图范围，出兵继承了南越对南沙群岛部分岛屿的占领，并与中国发生了边境冲突。中国政府方面声称“上述种种举动威胁了中国的边境安全和影响了东南亚的局势稳定”，“为了捍卫主权，惩治侵略者”而发动了“自卫还击战”进入越南。而当时国际上大部分西方国家及苏联为首的社会主义国家阵营认为是中国侵略了越南。朝鲜与民主柬埔寨则站在中国一边。

中国的战前准备
1978年12月8日上午，中央军委正式下达作战命令，称“无论战果如何，我军攻克高平和谅山后不得恋战，即行撤回”。另外一种观点是，中共本来打算占领河内严惩越共以后再撤回。同时，与苏联、蒙古接壤的沈阳军区、北京军区、兰州军区、新疆军区均进入临战状态，这四大军区的乙种步兵师补充人员装备扩编为战时甲种师，各野战军离开营区进入野战地域（参见63军大事记、16军大事记）。
广州军区于1979年1月8日上午完成战术准备：4个野战军、3个地面炮兵师和高射炮兵师、铁道兵3个团、1个通信团、1个防化团、航空兵13个团另6个大队全部进入待命地点。（另空军高炮和地空导弹部队也同时完成战术部署；海军南海舰队在川岛以西各港口集结各型舰艇一百二十余艘和作战飞机一百七十余架。）
昆明军区临阵易帅，杨得志司令员1979年1月7日中午抵昆明上任，8至10日军区扩大会议研究作战部署预案。12日总参、军区、军、师各级领导赴边境调研。同时参战的11军、第13军、第14军和云南省军区边防部队，以公铁输送紧急开进，至1月10日凌晨完成战役展开，2月9日深夜完成了作战准备。

战争过程
战争分别由中国的云南省和广西壮族自治区两个作战方向，分为三个阶段进行。云南省作战由当时的昆明军区司令员杨得志指挥；广西壮族自治区作战由当时的广州军区司令员许世友指挥。总共动用了9个军29个步兵师（分别为：11军、13军、14军、41军、42军、43军、50军、54军、55军及20军第58师、广西军区独立师、云南省军区独立师、广西军区2个边防团、云南省军区5个边防团）、2个炮兵师（炮1师、炮4师）、两个高炮师（高炮65师、高炮70师），以及铁道兵、工程兵、通信兵等兵种部队近56万兵力的解放军部队（例如，战前准备中各个甲种步兵师、乙种步兵师都扩编为12000人以上的临战编制），在约500公里的战线上对越南发动了攻击。战争中一度攻占了越南约20多个城镇和军事据点。越军以6个步兵师（第三、三一六A、三三七、三三八、三四五、三四六师），十六个地方团及四个炮兵团，总兵力约100,000人应战。由于当时的越南经过南北战争又有经验、武器装备也比中国部队强。虽然基层指战员骁勇善战，但参战部队付出了沉重的代价。越军用以退为攻的战术、当中国部队撤退时越军进行反击战、这使中国部队伤亡人数增加。
第一阶段：1979年2月17日－1979年2月26日。中国政府称：中国云南、广西边防部队发动了对越南军队的自卫还击战；歼灭了以越南境内的高平、老街两地区为据点的越南侵略军预备队。
第二阶段：1979年2月27日－1979年3月5日。中国政府称：中国军队攻克了越南境内的军事要塞谅山市；歼灭了沙巴地区的越南军队。
第三阶段：1979年3月6日－1979年3月16日。中国政府称：该阶段中国军队以交替掩护，边清剿边撤退的方式，于1979年3月16日全部军队撤回中国境内。
据不明来源的统计：中国军队死2万人，伤4万多人；歼灭、击溃越南人民军的第3师、345师、356师，越军死伤约5.2万人。中国官方没有发表伤亡人数。越南官方也没有正式发表伤亡人数，只在官方的人民报上罗列了中国军队在撤退时对攻占过的城镇做出的大规模破坏项目。包括基建设施、厂矿等。
根据昆明军区后勤部编写的《对越自卫反击作战工作总结》，1979年2月17日至3月16日，广西、云南参战的解放军、支前民兵共牺牲6954人，伤14800多人；2月17日至2月27日击毙越军15000人，2月28日至3月16日击毙越军37000人。
根据越南国防部军事历史院编的《越南人民军50年 (1944-1994)》（军事谊文出版社有中译本），2月17日，中国出动60多万军队，数百辆坦克装甲车，数千门大炮，在广宁至莱州的整个北部边界全线对越南发动了大规模进攻。经过30个昼夜(2.17-3.18)的战斗，消灭和重创了3个团18个营，击毁和击伤550辆军车(坦克装甲车280辆),击毁115门大炮和重型炮击炮，缴获了大量武器。

战争评述
这场战争表面上是一场国与国之间由于边境纠纷而引发的局部战争。但从其发动背景来看，应该是一场中国共产党对国内凝聚民族向心力以巩固其政权；对外展示军事实力和政治决心的战争。
对内：当时中国的文化大革命刚结束，新一届领导集体开始执政。由于文化大革命对国内人民造成的对共产党统治阶层的信任危机，中国领导人认为有必要发动一场“打击侵略者”的战争，以重新凝聚其国民的民族向心力。
对外：由于当时还处在冷战时期，苏联与美国在世界范围内存在广泛的利益冲突，而中国由于与苏联交恶和以往输出革命的策略，导致了其在东亚地区处于相对孤立的局面。为了显示中国共产党对国家的统治能力和对军队的指挥能力，拓展外部空间并援助其盟友红色高棉政权，在越南的盟友苏联忙于阿富汗战争无暇对中国施加压力，而美国由于刚刚与中国改善了关系也乐于让中国教训越南以遏制苏联时，发动了此次战争。
后果
战争的后果仍在持续，特别是在越南。今天越南仍然维持著世界上最大的陆军之一，其中的一些原因就是出于对中国的担忧。1980年代，在双方的边界上仍有小的冲突，并造成一千多人死亡。中越双方的关系直到1990年代早期才得到改善。
这场战争还造成在越的华裔继续受到歧视并被迫移民。他们重新在一些唐人街定居，或移居到澳大利亚、欧洲或北美的其他亚裔社区，也有部分华裔回到中国境内定居。
在中国，这场战争在很大程度上已经被遗忘。在官方的文本中很少有提及，而在绝大部分的历史教科书也很少记述.




Sino-Soviet Relations and
the February 1979 Sino-Vietnamese Conflict
by Bruce Elleman
20 April 1996

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gerald Segal, in his 1985 book Defending China, concluded that China';s 1979 war against Vietnam was a complete failure: "China failed to force a Vietnamese withdrawal from [Cambodia], failed to end border clashes, failed to cast doubt on the strength of the Soviet power, failed to dispel the image of China as a paper tiger, and failed to draw the United States into an anti-Soviet coalition."
In an attempt to challenge this view that Beijing';s policy was a failure, this paper will strive to reevaluate the central role that Sino-Soviet relations played on China';s decision to attack Vietnam. Most importantly, it will try to show that the timing of China';s February 17th attack on Vietnam was linked to the 29th anniversary of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance.
One should recall that on February 14, 1950 Beijing and Moscow signed a 30-year treaty that included secret protocols supporting the USSR';s role as leader of the world communist movement. When Moscow later refused to renegotiate Sino-Soviet territorial disputes, this led to Sino-Soviet border clashes, most importantly during the late 1960s.
Western scholars have all too often overlooked that even during this period of Sino-Soviet tensions, the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance remained fully in force throughout this entire period of unrest. From Beijing';s viewpoint at least, the 1950 Sino-Soviet treaty was a major instrument through which Moscow had tried to exert its "hegemony" over China.
Moscow was clearly concerned what might happen when the Sino-Soviet treaty reached its 30-year term. Beginning in 1969, the USSR frequently urged China to replace the 1950 treaty with a new agreement. During 1978, Soviet forces were increased along the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders. Moscow also sought to force Beijing to come to terms by intensifying diplomatic relations with Hanoi, signing a twenty-five year defense treaty with Vietnam on November 3, 1978.
Instead of backing down, however, China announced its intention to invade Vietnam on February 15, 1979, the very first day that it could legally terminate the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty and it attacked three days later. When Moscow did not intervene, Beijing publicly proclaimed that the USSR had broken its numerous promises to assist Vietnam. The USSR';s failure to support Vietnam emboldened China to announce on April 3, 1979 that it intended to terminate the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance.
Instead of working under the assumption that China';s 1979 invasion of Vietnam was a complete failure, this paper will try to show that one of the primary diplomatic goals behind China';s attack was to expose Soviet assurances of military support to Vietnam as a fraud. Seen in this light, Beijing';s policy was actually a diplomatic success, since Moscow did not actively intervene, thus showing the practical limitations of the Soviet-Vietnamese military pact. As a result, this paper will suggest that China achieved a strategic victory by minimizing the future possibility of a two-front war against the USSR and Vietnam and a diplomatic victory by terminating of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty.
This paper will also reevaluate Beijing';s claim that the USSR';s failure to intervene against China proved that it was merely a "paper polar bear." Recently declassified archival documents from the USSR have tended to support China';s claim, raising the important question of whether by 1979 Beijing had already correctly identified Far Eastern symptoms of Moscow';s internal decay -- the same decay that eventually brought the Soviet government down in 1991 -- several years before similar evidence of this decay became widely available in the European theater. If so, then the possibility exists that the `beginning of the end'; of the Cold War actually occurred in Asia.
A Brief History of Sino-Soviet Relations Through the Late 1960s
Sino-Soviet relations through the late 1960s were marred not only by sharp disagreement over the status of Outer Mongolia, but also by numerous territorial disputes along the Sino-Soviet border. In fact, these conflicts had festered beneath the surface of Russo-Chinese relations for over a century, ever since Imperial Russia forced China to sign a series of treaties ceding it vast territories. According to S. C. M. Paine';s forthcoming book Imperial Rivals : "For China, the physical territorial losses were enormous: an area exceeding that of the United States east of the Mississippi River officially became Russian territory or, in the case of Outer Mongolia, a Soviet protectorate."
Following China';s 1949 revolution, Mao Zedong journeyed to Moscow to negotiate a formal treaty with Stalin. After two months, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance was completed and was signed on February 14, 1950. The duration of this treaty was thirty years, and clause number six specifically stated that if neither signatory announced their intention to terminate the treaty during its final year, then the alliance would automatically be extended for a further five years.
In fact, published versions of this Sino-Soviet treaty did not include many secret protocols. The Winter 1995 edition of Cold War International History Project Bulletin includes an account of Mao';s description of the secret Sino-Soviet negotiations:
     During  the  negotiations, at Stalin';s  initiative
     there  was  undertaken an attempt  by  the  Soviet
     Union  to  assume sole ownership  of  the  Chinese
     Changchun  (i.e.  Harbin) Railway.   Subsequently,
     however,  a  decision  was made  about  the  joint
     exploitation  of the . . . Railway, besides  which
     the  PRC  gave  the USSR the naval  base  in  Port
     Arthur, and four joint stock companies were opened
     in China.  At Stalin';s initiative, . . . Manchuria
     and  Xinjiang were practically turned into spheres
     of influence of the USSR.
Thus, although the public sections of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty have long been known, an undetermined number of secret protocols were also signed; to date, copies of these protocols have never been published. (Bruce Elleman, "The End of Extraterritoriality in China: The Case of the Soviet Union, 1917-1960," Republican China (forthcoming, Spring 1996)
On February 15, 1950, Mao also grudgingly agreed to recognize the "independent status" of the MPR. This admission was a far cry from recognizing Mongolia';s complete independence from China, however, since Mao firmly believed that the Soviet government had earlier promised to return Mongolia to China. Based on Mao';s later complaints, Mao must have received assurances from Stalin that Mongolia';s status, as well as the exact location of the Sino-Mongolian and Sino-Soviet borders, would be discussed at future meetings. Thus, it was Moscow';s refusal to open negotiations with Beijing eventually led to border clashes during the 1950s and 1960s. Although the Sino-Mongolian border was resolved in 1962, Mao publicly denounced Soviet encroachments on Chinese territory and he protested Soviet control of Mongolia: "[T]he Soviet Union, under the pretext of assuring the independence of Mongolia, actually placed the country under its domination."
During the late 1960s, in a series of border incidents along the Ussuri and Amur rivers the People';s Liberation Army (PLA) showed surprising tenacity against the Red Army. These conflicts were small in scope and the outcome proved to be inconclusive, but they led to later territorial conflicts in Xinjiang along China';s border with the USSR.
Although tension in Sino-Soviet relations was so great that many Western scholars referred to it as a "split," the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty continued to exist. In fact, this treaty, including both the publicly released terms and the secret protocols, was still the foundation on which Sino-Soviet relations rested. This foundation was unstable from the very beginning, however, since the USSR refused to return Tsarist Russia';s ill-gotten gains to China';s communist leadership. Arguably it was this issue, more than any other, that led China';s leaders to condemn Soviet "hegemonism" in the Far East. It was also this issue that was destined to sour China';s relations with Vietnam during the 1970s.
Sino-Soviet Relations During the 1970s
Sino-Soviet border disputes during the late 1960s were particularly disturbing to Moscow and Beijing, since both the USSR and China were now nuclear powers; apparently an informal consensus was reached that neither side would resort to air power. (Christian F. Ostermann, "New Evidence on The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 5 (Spring 1995), 186-193.)
These Sino-Soviet border conflicts had enormous social repercussions, however, forcing both countries to divert scarce resources to prepare for a possible nuclear war or for future military escalation along their mutual borders. The PLA';s new-found confidence that it could counter the Red Army also gave Beijing the opportunity during 1971 to adopt a new foreign policy initiative by promoting friendly relations with the United States.
In addition, China tried hard to improve its relations with Japan, signing a treaty in August 1978 which appeared to be critical of the Soviet Union';s foreign policy in Asia by specifically condemning "hegemonism." Finally, Sino-Soviet tensions also spawned a number of Southeast Asian proxy wars, such as the late 1970s'; conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam, as well as forcing China to accept its role as a regional power, best shown by its 1979 invasion of Vietnam to undermine the USSR';s growing influence.
Throughout the 1970s, Sino-Soviet tensions remained high. During this period, Moscow tried to convince Beijing to negotiate a new agreement that would either support, or even replace, the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty. Beginning in 1969 and 1970, Moscow proposed that the two sides promise not to attack each other, and especially not to ever resort to the use of nuclear weapons. When Beijing did not show any interest in this accord, however, Moscow suggested in 1971 that the two countries sign a new treaty that would disavow force altogether. Thereafter, in 1973 Moscow showed its concern by specifically proposing that the two countries sign a non-aggression pact; Beijing continued to ignore Moscow';s advances.
As the end of the Sino-Soviet Treaty';s 30-year term neared, the USSR';s efforts to replace this treaty increased dramatically. For example, on 24 February 1978, Moscow publicly proposed that the two governments issue a statement of principles which would regulate Sino-Soviet relations. This statement of principles would include: 1) equality, 2) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, 3) noninterference in each other';s internal affairs, and 4) the nonuse of force. Moscow clearly hoped that such a statement could be used in place of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty to regulate Sino-Soviet relations. The ultimate goal of the USSR';s proposals, however, was clearly to limit, or perhaps even to reduce, China';s growing influence throughout Asia. (According to Chang Pao-min, this aspect of the Soviet policies towards China was most attractive to the the Vietnamese, even quoting one Vietnamese official as stating: "There is a tangibly strong Soviet interest coinciding with Vietnamese interests - to reduce Chinese influence in this part of the world." Chang Pao-min, Kampuchea Between China and Vietnam (Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1985), 46-47.)
Beijing refused all of Moscow';s proposals, however, and throughout the 1970s China';s condemnation of the USSR became more vocal. For example, during February 1974, Mao Zedong publicly called for a "third world" coalition against the so-called "first world," in this case including both the USSR and the USA. After Mao';s death, however, a 1 November 1977 issue of Renmin Ribao, identified the USSR as China';s most dangerous enemy while the United States was now considered an ally. All of the socialist countries -- including especially Vietnam ( "The breakdown of Vietnam';s relations with China after 1975 and Vietnam';s current pro-Soviet alignment may be traced to Vietnamese resistance to Chinese pressures to take sides." Ramesh Thaku and Carlyle Thayer, Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam (New York, St. Martin';s Press, 1992), 287.) -- were also considered potential allies in a proposed "united front" against the USSR. Finally, on 26 March 1978, China';s Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanded that Moscow, in addition to recognizing the existence of "disputed areas" along the Sino-Soviet border, must completely withdraw Soviet troops from the MPR, as well as pulling them back from along the entire Sino-Soviet border.
In response to China';s demands, Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, visited Siberia during early April 1978, and announced that new, more advanced equipment had been provided to missile units stationed along the Sino-Soviet border. These new weapons, Brezhnev announced, would be instrumental in "securing ourselves and our socialist friends against possible aggression, whatever the source." Soon afterwards, on 12 April 1978, Ulan Bator also publicly protested Beijing';s demands, stating that additional Soviet troops had been stationed along the Sino-Mongolia border at Mongolia';s request in order to offset increased Chinese troop concentrations to the south of the border.
As these events quite clearly show, by 1978 Sino-Soviet border tensions had dramatically intensified, mainly due to increased Soviet troop concentrations along the Sino-Soviet border and in the MPR. To a large degree, this situation can be explained by Moscow';s continuing attempts to pressure Beijing not to terminate the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty, which could be terminated for the very first time in 1979, or -- better yet -- to negotiate a new treaty which would outline principles on which future Sino-Soviet relations would be based. Brezhnev';s announcement that he intended to use Soviet forces against China on behalf of Moscow';s "socialist friends" was also a warning to Beijing to keep its hands off the MPR as well as Moscow';s allies in Southeast Asia.
China not only did not buckle under the USSR';s diplomatic and military pressure, but Beijing tried to exert diplomatic pressure on Moscow in turn by working hard to solidify its relations with both the United States and Japan. Arguably, Beijing';s policy was the more successful of the two, resulting in Beijing concluding landmark agreements with both Washington and Tokyo. To Moscow, it must have seemed clear that China';s new agreements were directed against the USSR, since -- in the case of the Sino-Japanese treaty at least -- the two sides specifically condemned "hegemonism," the oft-used Chinese code word for Soviet expansionism. The USSR response was to strengthen its diplomatic relations with all of the Southeast Asian countries bordering on China, and most importantly among them, with Vietnam.
Sino-Soviet Relations and Vietnam Through February 1979
Although China may not have been a participant in the Vietnam conflict during the 1960s and 1970s, China';s economic and material support for Vietnam played a crucial role. Not only did China send troops to Vietnam to help maintain supply lines, but Beijing';s estimate of its support for Hanoi between 1950 to 1978 exceeded $20 billion. (King C. Chen, China';s War with Vietnam, 1979 (Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1987), 27) It is not hard to understand, therefore, why Beijing might be miffed at improving relations between Moscow and Hanoi during the late 1970s.
This was especially true after the two countries signed a mutual defense treaty on 3 November 1978 that was specifically aimed at China. According to one scholar, this Soviet-Vietnamese alliance made Vietnam the "linchpin" in the USSR';s "drive to contain China." (Robert A. Scalapino, "The Political Influence of the USSR in Asia," in Donald S. Zagoria, ed., Soviet Policy in East Asia (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1982), 71.) From Beijing';s perspective, therefore, Moscow';s attempt to surround China diplomatically appeared to be on the verge of succeeding. This realization sparked China';s invasion of Vietnam in February 1979.
Although diplomatic relations between Beijing and Hanoi during the 1960s and early 1970s were generally good, policy differences between China and Vietnam widened after the April 1975 fall of Saigon. In September of that year, Le Duan, the secretary-general of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), traveled to Beijing and during the series of meetings that followed Le Duan';s arrival it became clear that China was very concerned about Vietnam';s close relations with the USSR. Although relations continued to worsen during the following years, the rift between China and Vietnam first became apparent only when thousands of ethnic Chinese began to flee Vietnam during the spring and summer of 1978. In addition, territorial disputes over the Spratly Islands, as well as over Vietnam';s recent invasion of Cambodia, also increased Sino-Vietnamese tensions.
Meanwhile, increasing signs of Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation also appeared during the summer of 1978, as Vietnam asked to become a member of Comecon. In addition, government sources in the United States reported that by August 1978 as many as 4,000 Soviet advisors were in Vietnam. During September 1978, the USSR began carrying out increased arms shipments to Vietnam, both by air and by sea, which included "aircraft, missiles, tanks, and munitions." Finally, all of these signs of improving Soviet-Vietnamese relations came to fruition on 3 November 1978, when Vietnam and the USSR signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. There was no doubt that this treaty was aimed at China, since the sixth clause stated that Vietnam and the USSR would "immediately consult each other" if either is "attacked or threatened with attack . . . with a view to eliminating that threat." Reportedly, this treaty also included a secret protocol granting Soviet military forces access to Vietnam';s "airfields and ports." (Ramesh Thaku and Carlyle Thayer, Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam (New York, St. Martin';s Press, 1992), 61.)
Although Vietnam claimed that it signed this treaty with the USSR to stop Chinese "adventurist" acts, Chinese leaders in Beijing undoubtedly saw this as part of Moscow';s efforts to pressure China into backing down and renewing the unequal terms of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty. If the USSR were able to establish a foothold in southeast Asia, it could flank China on both its northern and southern borders. If successful, this policy might give Moscow sufficient leverage to force Beijing into renewing, or at least renegotiating, the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty on Moscow';s terms. An early indicator of Beijing';s concern over the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty was voiced by Renmin Ribao which warned that Moscow was using Vietnam against China as it had earlier tried -- and failed -- to use Cuba to exert diplomatic pressure against the United States. Beijing also warned that Moscow';s ultimate goal was to "bring the whole of Indochina under its control."
By signing the Soviet-Vietnamese defense treaty on 3 November 1978, the USSR hoped to use its relations with Vietnam to outmaneuver and outflank China. China';s main concern was that if the USSR';s policies in Vietnam were successful, then the Soviet government might achieve a strategic and military stranglehold over China. Ever since the Sino-Soviet rift, and especially since the Sino-Soviet border conflicts of the late 1960s, Beijing';s primary goal had been to build up its own military potential in order to face off the Soviet Red Army, a goal which it had largely achieved during the middle to late 1960s, early 1970s, when the PLA';s strength reportedly reached 3.6 million men. Diplomatically, Beijing continued to try to flank Moscow by officially normalizing its relations with Washington on 1 January 1979. Ramses Amer has concluded that the USSR';s and China';s new alliances were closely linked: "Thus two strategic alliances had been created in the closing months of 1978, a Soviet-Vietnamese alliance and a Sino-American alliance, and they would prevail for about a decade."
As a result of the Sino-American rapprochement in early 1979, Moscow';s concern about a two-front war with American-led NATO forces in the west and Chinese forces in the east was increased. This may have convinced Moscow to increase its support for Vietnam';s ongoing invasion of Cambodia, an event that Robert Ross has closely linked with China';s subsequent attack on Vietnam when he argued that the unraveling of China';s close ally in Cambodia greatly concerned Beijing. While Beijing was unwilling to intervene directly in Cambodia to stop Vietnamese encroachment, China';s military invasion into disputed Sino-Vietnamese territory was in fact closely "synchronized" with Vietnam';s invasion in Cambodia. Ross has further concluded that the ongoing disputes over Cambodia and the Sino-Vietnamese border had an "organic connection," as Chinese leaders warned Vietnam not to mistakenly think that China was "weak and easily bullied."
In the final analysis, however, Vietnam was a relatively small country both in terms of population and military strength, and it was probably the sudden arrival of large numbers of Soviet advisors -- an estimated 5,000-8,000 by mid-1979 -- and enormous quantities of military supplies that boded ill for China';s immediate strategic security; thus, according to King C. Chen: "Had there been no Soviet-Vietnamese alliance, the sixteen-day war between China and Vietnam might not have been fought." In a clear admission that the USSR';s military cooperation with Vietnam deeply concerned China, Deng Xiaoping publicly acknowledged that this new Soviet-Vietnamese "military alliance" was really just part of the USSR';s long-time goal of wanting to "encircle China."
Following the signing of the 3 November 1978 Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty, Beijing had to find a way to break this Soviet attempt to encircle China. Thus, it was fear of being outflanked by Moscow that was instrumental in pushing Beijing into action. Clearly, China';s first step was to test the USSR';s resolve to see whether it would stand by its treaty with Vietnam or whether it would back down and accept defeat. Deng Xiaoping even reportedly told President Carter in January 1979 that a war between China and Vietnam would "disrupt Soviet strategic calculations . . . " As a result, even Ross has concluded that in the wake of Vietnam';s successful occupation of Cambodia, it was "the resultant Soviet encirclement of China [that] necessitated a limited invasion of Vietnam."
The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War
Chinese forces invaded Vietnam on 17 February 1979. Although the exact motives underlying China';s attack are still open to interpretation, Beijing';s concern that Moscow';s twenty-five year defense treaty with Hanoi might lead to the Soviet militarization of the Sino-Vietnamese border was certainly a major factor; Moscow probably also hoped that its treaty with Hanoi would divert Chinese troops away from the north, thus weakening China';s military defense along the Sino-Soviet border.
Moscow';s hopes were dashed, however, when Beijing decided to attack Vietnam. After only three weeks of fighting, China withdrew and disputes over the Sino-Vietnamese border remained unresolved. To most outsiders, China';s military action thus appeared to be a failure. But, if the real goal behind China';s attack was to expose Soviet assurances of military support to Vietnam as a fraud, then the USSR';s refusal to intervene effectively terminated the Soviet-Vietnamese defense treaty. Thus, Beijing did achieve a clear strategic victory by breaking the Soviet encirclement and by eliminating Moscow';s threat of a two-front war.
On 15 February 1979, not only the 29th anniversary of the Mao-Stalin agreement on Mongolia but also the first day that China could have officially announced the termination of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, Deng Xiaoping declared that China planned to conduct a limited attack on Vietnam. To prevent Soviet intervention on Vietnam';s behalf, Deng warned Moscow the next day that China was prepared for a full-scale war against the USSR; in preparation for this conflict, China put all of her troops along the Sino-Soviet border on an emergency war alert, set up a new military command in Xinjiang, and even evacuated an estimated 300,000 civilians from the Sino-Soviet border.(Chang Pao-min, Kampuchea Between China and Vietnam (Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1985), 88-89.)
In addition, the bulk of China';s active forces (as many as one-and-a-half million troops) were stationed along China';s borders with the USSR. (Robert A. Scalapino "Asia in a Global Context: Strategic Issue for the Soviet Union," in Richard H. Solomon and Masataka Kosaka, eds., The Soviet Far East Military Buildup (Dover, MA. , Auburn House Publishing Company, 1986), 28.)
As promised, China';s military offensive against Vietnam began on 17 February 1979, within three days of the 29th anniversary of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty. As Deng had announced, from the very beginning China conducted a limited action against Vietnam. Not only were many of China';s best troops stationed along the Sino-Soviet border, but Beijing decided not to deploy the estimated 500 fighters and bombers it had stationed in the area. In response to China';s attack, the USSR sent several naval vessels and initiated a Soviet arms airlift to Vietnam. On 22 February 1979, Colonel N. A. Trarkov, the Soviet military attach?in Hanoi, even threatened that the USSR would "carry out is obligations under the Soviet-Vietnam treaty;" elsewhere, however, Soviet diplomats made it clear that the USSR would not intervene as long as the conflict remained limited. (John Blodgett, "Vietnam: Soviet Pawn or Regional Power?" in Rodney W. Jones and Steven A. Hildreth, eds., Emerging Powers Defense and Security in the Third World (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1986), 98). The USSR clearly had no intention of risking a full-scale war with China for the sake of Vietnam.
After three weeks of intense fighting, China could claim that it captured three of Vietnam';s six provincial capitals -- Cao Bang, Lang Son, and Lao Cai -- that bordered on China. Although the Chinese forces totaled over a quarter million men, the Vietnamese turned to guerrilla tactics to rob China of a quick victory. When Beijing announced its intention to withdraw its troops on 5 March 1979, therefore, it appeared that the primary goals of this offensive had yet to be achieved; namely, Vietnam';s military potential had not been seriously damaged by China. Thereafter, the Sino-Vietnamese border remained tense when, after less than three weeks of fighting, China withdrew from Vietnam.
To many outside observers, it appeared that China';s attack against Vietnam was a complete and total failure. But, as Banning Garrett has correctly observed, the "Chinese demonstrated that they could attack a Soviet ally without retaliation from the `paper polar bear';." (Banning Garrett, "The Strategic Triangle and the Indochina Crisis," in David W. P. Elliott, ed., The Third Indochina Conflict, (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1981), 212.)
In fact, by proving that the USSR would not actively intervene on Vietnam';s behalf, China was convinced that its termination of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty would also not lead to war. As a result, on 3 April 1979, Beijing announced its intentions to terminate the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. Thereafter, although Sino-Soviet negotiations were officially opened during October 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gave China a pretense for calling off future meetings, thereby precluding any immediate need to negotiate a new Sino-Soviet diplomatic treaty.
Because the exact motives underlying China';s 1979 invasion of Vietnam have remained unclear, scholars studying this conflict have proposed many plausible sounding theories. Perhaps the most common has been that China wanted to "punish" Vietnam for invading Cambodia, an area which had formerly been considered a tributary state to the Chinese empire. Other Sino-Vietnamese problems, such as territorial disputes over the Spratly Islands or the mass exodus of Chinese nationals from Vietnam, have also been portrayed as playing a major role. Most convincing, however, have been the relatively small number of scholars who have argued that Vietnam';s decision to promote closer relations with the USSR was the primary reason behind China';s attack.
Among those scholars who have hypothesized that China';s actions were a response to the 3 November 1978 Soviet-Vietnamese defense treaty, there have been a wide range of interpretations as to whether China';s policy was a success or a failure. For example, according to Gerald Segal, China';s policy failed because it did not put the Soviet-Vietnamese defense treaty to the "ultimate test." Robert Ross also concluded that China';s policy was a failure, although he was more positive than Segal by granting that the Sino-Vietnamese war was the first time since 1949 that China had used force when its territory was not directly threatened, thus proving that China was now capable of "acting like a regional power with regional interests." Finally, Banning Garrett and Nayan Chanda have been more positive, at least acknowledging Chinese claims that the abortive Sino-Vietnamese war was a success because it proved that the USSR was a "paper polar bear" since Moscow refused to carry out its treaty obligation to intervene on Hanoi';s behalf.
Perhaps the most positive view of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict comes from Chang Pao-min. According to Chang, when one considers this conflict from Beijing';s point of view, then the 1978 Soviet-Vietnamese defense treaty was a clear threat to China';s security. Not only did the USSR hope to use this treaty to set up an "Asian Collective Security System" aimed at China, but its military relations with Vietnam were described as an attempt to "threaten and attempt to pin down China from the south;" in this regard, Vietnam was described in later Chinese statements as "the knife the Soviet Union has at China';s back." As Chang observed, therefore, the Sino-Vietnamese conflict must be seen as a reaction to the Soviet Union';s attempt to use Vietnam "to contain and encircle China in Southeast Asia . . . [thus posing] a serious threat to China';s southern flank."
The arguments presented in this paper tend to support the view that China';s February 1979 war with Vietnam was a success. Once Beijing was convinced that Moscow would not intervene on Hanoi';s behalf, this emboldened Beijing to break with Moscow completely; this break can best be seen in Beijing';s 3 April 1979 announcement that it intended to terminate the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty. As final proof that China';s policies in Vietnam were inextricably linked with the USSR, Amers has accurately noted that China';s 1988 decision to disengage its border relations with Vietnam from the issue of Cambodia corresponded almost exactly with Gorbachev';s attempts to normalize relations with China and improve the USSR';s relations with the ASEAN states. Thus, by breaking the Soviet encirclement and eliminating Moscow';s threat of a two-front war, China achieved a significant strategic victory against the USSR.
Was the USSR a "aper Polar Bear"?
Western scholars have almost universally concluded that China';s 1979 invasion of Vietnam was a failure. For example, according to Gerald Segal, "the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese war was China';s most important foreign policy failure since 1949." To a large degree Robert Ross agreed, stating: "The failure of Chinese policy underscores the ambiguous role of the regional power in contemporary international politics." Most recently, Ellis Joffe, a specialist on the PLA at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, concluded: "China got burned by limited measures against Vietnam in 1979. China was going to teach Vietnam a lesson, but Vietnam taught China a lesson." ("Strait of Uncertainty Taiwan braves increased pressure from China," Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 February 1996, 20-21.)
These negative Western assessments are in sharp contrast to Beijing';s own claims that its 1979 war against Vietnam was a success, since Moscow';s decision not to intervene proved that the USSR was merely a "paper polar bear." Beijing apparently was willing to back up this claim with action, when it not only announced the termination of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty but then later delivered to Moscow three preconditions for improving Sino-Soviet relations. These three preconditions included: 1) withdrawing Soviet troops from the Sino-Soviet border and Mongolia, 2) withdrawing Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and 3) stopping Soviet support for Vietnam';s incursion into Cambodia. (Yao Wengin, "Soviet Military Deployments in the Asia-Pacific Region: Implications for China';s Security," in Richard H. Solomon and Masataka Kosaka, eds., The Soviet Far East Military Buildup (Dover, MA., Auburn House Publishing Company, 1986), 103.)
In addition to adopting a more assertive posture in its relations with the USSR, therefore, China';s southern neighbors have also been forced to treat her with more respect; according to one 1986 report, because Hanoi lost its 1979 gamble that Beijing would never actually attack, Vietnam, "chastened by the experience of 1979, now stations 700,000 combat troops in the northern portion of the country." (Karl D. Jackson, "Indochina, 1982-1985: Peace Yields to War," in Richard H. Solomon and Masataka Kosaka, eds., The Soviet Far East Military Buildup (Dover, MA., Auburn House Publishing Company, 1986), 206.)
China';s more assertive role in Asia during the 1980s suggests, therefore, that Beijing actually believed that it was victorious in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese war. Thus, although Nayan Chanda and others have warned that Chinese claims that the USSR was merely a "paper polar bear" may simply have been propaganda, Beijing';s own actions indicate that they firmly believed this view. It is for this reason that recent discussions about when the Cold War really ended would appear to have a direct bearing on Beijing';s 1979 claim that Moscow was already too weak to fight. In fact, according to China';s view, the USSR';s failure to intervene on Vietnam';s behalf in 1979 was proof positive that Moscow no longer had the stomach to fight a major war; in other words, the most dangerous era of the Cold War was already over.
Until now, popular discussion of whether the Cold War was actually over earlier than the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall has revolved around statements made by retired four-star Soviet General Anatoly Gribkov, who was the former chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact during the early 1980s. Gribkov bases his arguments on the fact that by December 1981, the Soviet Politburo had clearly lost the political will to use force to keep their extended empire in line. This assessment was made based on the Politburo';s refusal to send troops to Poland to thwart a democratic takeover, a sign of weakness that Gribkov points to as evidence that the USSR actually "lost" the Cold War as early as 1981.("The Two Trillion Dollar Mistake," Worth, (February 1996), 78-83/128-129. )
Recently declassified minutes of a Soviet Politburo meeting from 10 December 1981 tend to support Gribkov';s claims, by showing that the option of sending troops against Poland';s "Solidarity" party was unanimously rejected by Moscow as too great a risk. (Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 5 (Spring 1995), 135-137) In addition, these minutes reveal that the Politburo seriously considered backing down in the Far East by ordering the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia; if Moscow had actually carried out this plan, then it would have been acceding to one of Beijing';s three preconditions for improving Sino-Soviet relations.
These Soviet documents, and others like them, appear to support Gribkov';s claim that by 1981 the Soviet leadership had already lost the ability to use force in order to shore up the crumbling Soviet empire. This exact same reasoning could also be applied to the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese conflict, since China';s invasion of Vietnam clearly posed a real threat to the security and stability of the USSR';s sphere of influence in Southeast Asia. The very fact that the Soviet Politburo declined to carry through on its treaty obligations to Vietnam and refused to intervene against China would suggest that Gribkov';s argument that the Soviet Politburo had lost the political will to hold its empire together by force could be equally -- if not better -- applied to the outcome of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese war.
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the USSR';s unexpected collapse in 1991 demands a new assessment of the impact of Sino-Soviet relations on the February 1979 Sino-Vietnamese conflict. One facet of this assessment must be to consider whether China';s 1979 claim that the USSR was already a "paper polar bear" now appears more plausible in light of the USSR';s subsequent dissolution. Although Gribkov';s claim that the Cold War was already over in 1981 may be far earlier than most Western scholars have been willing to accept, it is several years later than China';s view. In hindsight, China';s 1979 date not only appears plausible, therefore, but to future scholars the year 1979 may one day prove to be even more accurate than 1981. If so, then Beijing must be given proper credit for correctly identifying Far Eastern symptoms of Moscow';s internal weakness more than two years before similar indications became discernible in the West. This then raises the question of whether `the beginning of the end'; of the Cold War really took place in 1979, as a result of Moscow';s refusal to accept Beijing';s boldfaced challenge to the USSR';s military supremacy in the Far East.
Conclusion
Previous studies of the 17 February 1979 Sino-Vietnamese conflict have generally portrayed China';s actions as an absolute failure. This paper, by contrast, has attempted to reevaluate the Sino-Vietnamese war in terms of Sino-Soviet relations by linking this conflict to the 29th anniversary of the signing of the 14 February 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. As a direct result of the USSR';s decision not to intervene on Vietnam';s behalf, China became convinced that the USSR lacked the political will to resort to war in order to sustain the Soviet sphere of influence in Asia. This conviction led Beijing to inform Moscow on 3 April 1979 that China intended to terminate the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty upon reaching its 30-year term in 1980.
From 1950 through until 1979, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance was the foundation on which Sino-Soviet relations rested. Although the published sections of this treaty have long been available, the exact content of the secret protocols that were attached to this treaty are still largely unknown. That these secret protocols related to Sino-Soviet territorial disputes is fairly clear, however, and during the 1950s and 1960s frequent border disputes between the USSR and China reflected the degree of tension that these secret protocols produced. Although none of the Sino-Soviet border conflicts were allowed to escalate into all-out war, Beijing was continually testing the USSR';s resolve to see whether it would resort to force to uphold the terms of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty. Thus, from Beijing';s point of view, the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty was the major tool through which Moscow tried to exert its "hegemony" over China and throughout the rest of Asia.
Moscow, by contrast, was clearly concerned what might happen when the Sino-Soviet Treaty reached its 30-year term. Beginning in 1969, the USSR frequently urged China to replace this treaty with a new agreement. To force Beijing to retreat, Moscow not only fortified the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders, but it also exerted pressure on China from the south, by completing a treaty of alliance with Vietnam. Thus, the improvement in Soviet-Vietnamese relations, culminating in the signing of the 3 November 1978 Sino-Vietnamese defense treaty, can be directly linked to China';s worsening relations with the USSR during the late 1970s. Instead of backing down, however, China invaded Vietnam on 17 February 1979, just three days after the 29th anniversary of the signing of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty. When Moscow refused to intervene on Hanoi';s behalf, Beijing decided that the Soviet Politburo would not resort to war to force China to retain the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty and so was emboldened to announce on 3 April 1979 that it intended to terminate this treaty.
One of Beijing';s primary goals in attacking Vietnam was to insure that China was not surrounded on both the north and south by Soviet forces. China';s 1979 invasion of Vietnam, for all of its obvious failings, did achieve this strategic objective since the USSR';s refusal to intervene on Vietnam';s behalf undermined the threat of a two-front war with the USSR and Vietnam. Diplomatically, China also won a clear victory against Soviet attempts to pressure her into signing a new treaty to replace or augment the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance of 14 February 1950. Finally, in hindsight, China';s claim that the USSR was really just a "paper polar bear" appears to have been fairly accurate, and thus represents perhaps the first outside indicator that the Soviet empire was threatened by internal collapse, a collapse that only became evident ten years later with the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall and with the 1991 dissolution of the USSR.
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The Sino-Vietnam War-1979: Case Studies in Limited Wars
Colonel G.D. Bakshi, VSM
The First and the Second World Wars were classical "Total Conflicts". They entailed the most massive and sustained mobilisation of the human and material resources of the nation states involved. These sustained mobilisations were kept up for periods of four to six years in which the war aims were pitched at the maximal level of unconditional surrender, the annihilation of the enemy’s armed forces and the complete occupation of his territory. As a test of wills between two state actors it epitomised the maximalist position in war fighting. The end of the Second World War saw the advent of nuclear weapons. These transformed the very paradigm of war per se. In fact weapons of mass destruction radically transformed the nature of war itself. A clear cut and decisive conventional military victory was no longer possible in a situation of nuclear symmetry. All that the nuclear exchange could ensure was "Mutual Assured Destruction". The acronym MAD aptly highlighted the insanity of this concept. This led to the onset of an era of strategic restraint. The super powers made great efforts to limit the levels of conflict. Western theories of deterrence during the Cold War restricted conflict in the key areas and confined them largely to the peripheral theatres of the globe. Korea and Vietnam were two major limited conflicts of this Cold War. Conflicts were kept restricted in three ways:
In their aim and scope,
In terms of space and time,
In terms of violence and weapon usage levels.
This trinity of limitations survived till the end of the Cold War. The Sino-Vietnam War of 1979 (that preceded the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) was a classic limited war - limited in aim and scope and also restricted in space and time. This was a conflict fought against a quasi-nuclear backdrop. (China had nuclear weapons and Vietnam was allied to a super power - the erstwhile USSR).
Revival of Interest in Limited War Theories
The Kargil conflict of May-Jul 1999 was fought against a nuclear backdrop. Both India and Pakistan had become overt nuclear powers (with a series of nuclear tests in May-June 1998). In the wake of the Kargil conflict, the Indian Institute of Strategic Studies held a very significant seminar in Feb 2000. This Seminar was devoted to the issue of Limited War against a possible nuclear backdrop. Both the Indian Defence Minister and the Army Chief clearly articulated the possibility of a Limited War in response to any future Pakistani intrusion/intensification of the proxy war in Kashmir. As a declaratory doctrinal statement - the Seminar was a landmark in intellectual exercise. It did create a stir in media circles and it highlighted certain critical issues. Namely:
Is a Limited Conventional War possible against a nuclear backdrop?
Can it be kept limited in terms of aim and scope and the restrictions of space and time?
What would be the in-built escalation control mechanisms at the national and international levels that could keep such conflicts limited?
Doctrinally, therefore, the issue is of vital import and deserves very detailed analysis and scrutiny. There is a need to build and test real world models and computer simulations that could help us to come to workable extrapolations that fit our conditions on the sub-continent. What must be kept in mind is the fact that in the post-Cold War world, the bipolar balance of power (or correlation of forces) has been seriously disturbed. This has led to a series of conventional conflicts where the West has employed its technological edge (engendered by the Revolution in Military Affairs) to launch punitive campaigns against designated "Rogue States"/ regional adversaries. Pertinent cases in point are:
The Gulf War against Iraq - 1990 (and subsequent air strikes)
The Air War against Yugoslavia – 1999
Most of these campaigns, however, are not relevant to an Indo-Pak or an India-China context because such asymmetries of technology do not exist between the regional actors. The bipolar stand offs of the Cold War era seem more pertinent and hence the revival of interest in Limited War doctrines in India and elsewhere.
The Case Study Method: Limited Wars in a Quasi Nuclear Context
It is precisely for this reason that we need to go back to the Sino-Vietnam War of 1979. Not only is it a useful operational and terrain analogue for the existing Indo-Pak situation but it was a Limited Conventional Conflict fought against a quasi-nuclear backdrop. The best way to analyse such an open-ended issue is the case study method. To come to any definitive conclusions we must rely upon real world models from the recent past. It is towards this end that the Sino-Vietnam War of Feb-Mar 1979 and the Vietnamese campaign in Cambodia that preceded it in Jan 79 form very useful historical case studies/conflict models from which we could extrapolate some very pertinent lessons in the Indo-Pak context. Put together, both these conflicts provide the best case study material to substantiate the thesis of Limited Conventional Conflicts in a quasi-nuclear backdrop. It must be reiterated here that China was a nuclear power of well over a decade’s standing in 1979. (Her first nuclear test was at Lop Nor in 1964). Vietnam then had treaty relationship with the erstwhile USSR - a full-fledged nuclear super power. To that extent this limited conventional conflict was waged against a "quasi-nuclear backdrop" and therefore forms the best conflict model for extrapolation of lessons/ game rules for a Limited Conventional War Doctrine between two nuclear-armed adversaries.
The Vietnam Model
Vietnam was in a very precarious security situation in 1978. The Chinese were bent upon exploiting the large Hoa (ethnic Chinese population) in South Vietnam for the purposes of destabilisation. They had lent full support to the genocidal regime of Pol Pot in Cambodia and were encouraging it to adopt an aggressive approach on the Vietnam-Cambodia border and open another front for Vietnam. The aim was to keep Vietnam militarily preoccupied and boxed in with the help of its neighbours. The Vietnamese correctly assessed the looming peril of a two front war situation. They decided upon a very high-tempo, pre-emptive offensive to deal with the Pol Pot threat in Cambodia, which would enable them to secure this flank before they turned North to face China squarely. The Vietnamese Military Invasion of Cambodia was therefore a major Coup de Main operation. Its essential features were as follows:
Just War. It was in essence a just war to free the Cambodian peoples from one of the worst tyrannies in recent history. The genocidal regime of Pol Pot has few parallels in recent times for senseless brutality and sheer savagery.
It was a Conventional Offensive that was limited only in the time dimension. It was not limited in aim or the spatial dimension. It aimed at:
- Military occupation of the whole of Cambodia.
- A decisive overthrow of the genocidal Pol Pot regime.
- It aimed to achieve the above results in a short, swift and high tempo campaign that had the imprimatur of the classic blitzkrieg (Air-Land campaign).
In terms of military mobility it was a superb example of Limited War that was limited only in the time dimension. It achieved decisive military and political results. To that extent it may well be termed a quasi-total campaign rather than a "Limited War".
The Chinese Limited War Model
The Chinese limited war against Vietnam in 1979 was a study in contrast. Where the Vietnamese campaign of Jan 1979 was swift and decisive, the Chinese campaign was characterised by severe limitations in:
Aim and scope. It confined itself to teaching a lesson as a Declaratory Aim.
Space. It confined itself to an average depth of 30-40 kms and went no further than the provincial capitals of Lang-Son, Cao Bang and Lao Cai.
Time. The campaign was called off once the limited objectives of the provincial capitals were reached/captured. The Chinese thereafter staged a unilateral withdrawal.
The Teach a Lesson Model
The British military analyst – Maj Gen Shelford Bidwell, has credited the Chinese with enunciating a new form of war. He called this "the teach a lesson model" and stated that the brief Sino-Indian War of 1962 was the world’s first campaign of this genre. This operation was ostensibly designed to teach India a lesson for her perceived support to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan resistance. The border dispute was a pretext conveniently exploited by the Chinese to launch a swift and sudden invasion (that caught the Indians totally by surprise), inflict a humiliating local defeat and then stage a magnanimous unilateral withdrawal that was designed to underline the impotence of the victim nation. It was the same ‘teach a lesson model’ that the Chinese decided to replicate against Vietnam. Unfortunately or otherwise, they ended up learning quite a few military lessons themselves - the first of them being the need to modernise their Army and transit from Peoples’ War doctrine to Peoples’ War under high tech conditions.
The basic doctrinal tenet of this Chinese formulation however remains sound and relevant to this day. The teach a lesson model implies a declaration of intent for limiting the conflict and to that extent, it serves as an inbuilt escalation control mechanism that could permit limited conventional conflict even against a nuclear backdrop. The historical fact is that it worked in the quasi-nuclear backdrop of the Soviet era and prevented a wider escalation of the Sino-Vietnam conflict to a wider war between China and the erstwhile USSR. To that extent the Sino-Vietnam War of 1979 forms a very useful conflict model and constitutes a case study that could yield a harvest of useful and pertinent lessons for our present day context.
Hai Ba Trung: The Historical Backdrop
The Sino-Vietnamese conflict is 21 centuries old. The Chinese colonised the Kingdom of Nam-Viet in the Red River delta before the birth of Christ. In AD 39 two Vietnamese sister queens named Trung-Trac and Trung-Nhi led a four year long revolt against the Chinese. The Hans sent strong reinforcements and crushed this rebellion. Rather than surrender, the two queens committed suicide by jumping into the Red River. To this day in March each year all Vietnamese girls celebrate the Hai- Ba Trung day. That the 1979 Chinese invasion came in Feb-March could only have stirred these historical memories of hate in Vietnam.
Other major revolts followed in the 3rd, 6th and 10th centuries. These helped to buildup the martial spirit of the Vietnamese. A dozen more wars were fought in the 15th century. Then Chinese power declined and Vietnam was able to assert its independence. From the 18th century onwards both China and Vietnam were involved in trying to stave off the yoke of foreign domination. Vietnam became a colony of France in the later half of the 18th century and for a while two historical enemies became allies against a common imperialist enemy. When the Second World War broke out, both Giap and Ho Chi Minh took shelter in the Yunan province of southern China. This served as the base for guerilla warfare against the French. The Regular Vietnamese Army was built up and trained in the Kwang Si Field firing ranges of China. However both Giap and Ho Chi Minh never forgot for an instant the historical realities. They refused all Chinese offers to intervene militarily on their behalf. Ho Chi Minh said, "It is better to sniff French dung for a while than to eat Chinese all our lives". During World War II the Japanese occupation forces overthrew the French in Vietnam. They could not consolidate their hold over the countryside and thus gave the Viet Minh guerillas their chance to move in. Thus when the French returned they were sucked in to a relentless guerilla war. In 1956 came Dien Bien Phu and the rout of the French forces in Indo-China. The Geneva conference partitioned Vietnam along the 17th parallel. It is noteworthy that Chou en Lai (Zhou en Lai) – the late Chinese Prime Minister played a significant role in this partition. The Chinese were not keen to see a strong united Vietnam on their southern borders. The Americans moved in and Vietnam’s agony dragged on for another 20 years - as a fierce guerilla war now started in the South against the pro American regime.
The Chinese appeared to be intent on fighting the Americans to "the last Vietnamese". However when the signs of American defeat became apparent the hardheaded Chinese realised that before them lay the prospect of a militarily strong and reunited Vietnam. Besides the Sino-Soviet rivalry had now turned into open with undisguised hostility. The Chinese stopped all Russian supplies from reaching Vietnam by land. They tacitly encouraged the Americans to stay. Before the American rout finally came in 1975 and the Viet Minh forces reunited Vietnam, the Chinese launched a naval attack and captured the disputed Parcel Islands in the South China Sea in 1974. The façade of friendship was over. The historical rivalries had flared into the open.
The Cambodian Preamble
During the closing stages of the war in Vietnam it had spilled over into the neighbouring Kampuchea. The famous Ho Chi Minh Trail (the infiltration route) from North to South Vietnam lay partly through Laos and Cambodia (Kampuchea). The Americans launched a major offensive in the Parrots Beak Bulge to cut off the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The CIA inspired a coup in which Gen Lon Nol overthrew the neutralist premier Norodom Shinouk. Shinouk fled to Peking and the pro Western regime of Lon Nol cooperated with the Americans in operations against the Viet Cong bases and caches. The Khmer Rogue guerillas – (an ultra leftist communist organisation in Kampuchea) began guerilla warfare to overthrow Lon Nol’s regime. The Vietnamese aided them in this. When the Americans withdrew from Vietnam and Saigon fell, the Khmer Rogue guerillas overthrew Lon Nol’s unpopular regime. Thus it was that the regime led by Pol Pot, Khieu Samphan and Iang Seary came into power in Phnom Phen.
However, just as China and Vietnam have been traditional enemies, so also Vietnam and Cambodia have been traditional foes. Whenever Vietnam has been strong she has occupied Kampuchea. The Chinese tried their best to fan this animosity. Egged on by them Pol Pot began to evict all people of Vietnamese origin from Kampuchea. The ultra-leftist Pol Pot regime let loose one of the most brutal reigns of terror in a crash attempt to communise the people. Entire towns were evacuated and the population sent to the countryside to collective farms and slave labour camps. It is estimated that as many as three million people died in these Pogroms. To divert the attention of the people the Pol Pot regime (with the backing of Beijing) began a series of border incidents with Vietnam. These flared up into a full-scale border war. By the end of 1978 Vietnam was faced with the following scenario:
The brutal Pol Pot regime had pushed out all Vietnamese settlers from Kampuchea. These refugees were streaming into South Vietnam.
It had launched a series of border incidents and violations with the encouragement of China.
North Vietnam’s own hold over the South was not as yet firm as the people were averse to attempts to communise them.
There was a sizeable ethnic Chinese minority (Hoa people) in South Vietnam. They controlled all the trade and were potential fifth columnists in any war with China.
China had stationed a large number of military advisors in Kampuchea, which were assisting the Pol Pot regime.
There was a sizeable concentration of Chinese troops on their northern borders and relations with China were worsening each day over the issue of the expulsion of the ethnic Chinese (Hoa) from South. Vietnam.

It was obvious to the Vietnamese High Command that a dangerous and difficult two front war situation was brewing up for them. If they did not act fast in Kampuchea a major threat would build up against their South. They might then be involved in a two front war with China and Kampuchea. The Vietnamese are hardheaded realists. Defence Minister Giap dispassionately analysed the situation and came to the conclusion that immediate and decisive measures were called for. Accordingly the following steps were taken:
A 25-year treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed with the Soviet Union in Nov 1978.
Preparations were undertaken for a major offensive in Cambodia in the post-monsoon dry season.
All out support was given to the guerillas of Heng Samrin who were trying to overthrow the brutal Pol Pot regime. Heng Samrin had been the divisional Commander of the 4th division in East Cambodia. He now headed the United Front Army for the salvation of Kampuchea.
The Blitzkrieg. By Christmas 1978 the Vietnamese had amassed approximately 14 divisions (some 130,000 tps) on the Kampuchean border. On 2nd Jan 1979 they launched a swift blitzkrieg spear headed by their armoured units that raced across Cambodia along the main highways. Little details of this operation are available but in style and tactical execution it was more reminiscent of Russian offensive concepts than the more cautious Vietnamese patterns.
The Vietnamese launched three main thrusts:
In the North West towards Stung-Treng and Kratie. This crossed the Mekong and raced across the middle of Cambodia along Highway 6. It captured Kampong Thom Sam Reap–Poviet and pushed on till it reached the Thailand border. This force also captured Angkor Vat - the liet motif of Cambodian nationalism.
Along Highway 7 and the Parrots Beak. This thrust was aimed at Phnom Phen the capital. This pushed on further along highway 5 towards Battam Bang-Poipet and to the Thai border.
A Naval landing at Kampong Som. Naval landing and a subsequent thrust along Highway 4 was also launched towards Phnom Phen the Cambodian capital.
The Vietnamese Air force (comprising of MIG-19s captured American F-5s and A-37s) launched fierce attacks from the airfields of Ho Chi Minh city (Saigon), Bien Hoa, and Binh Thy in support of their attacking columns. These columns raced along the roads and highways by passing or encircling major centres of resistance till they reached the Thailand border. Pol Pot himself was evacuated to Thai territory by helicopter to evade capture. It was a classic example of what Giap has termed "mobile operations". It was a perfect high tempo Air-land campaign that could serve as a text book model.
Psy Warfare. The United front troops began distributing cooking pots to the people to signify the end of the hated communal kitchens. The Pol Pot regime had totally alienated the population by its senseless brutality and its attempts to break up the family unit. People who had been evicted from the towns to work in the countryside began to stream back to their homes.
Effects of Vietnamese Victory in Kampuchea
China lost face due to its inability to protect its client regime of Pol Pot. The Chinese also lost some 10,000 "advisors" as prisoners. About a 1000 escaped towards Thailand in face of the Vietnamese blitzkrieg. The Chinese were alarmed at the specter of being encircled by pro-Soviet states like Vietnam and Afghanistan. They read a sinister pattern into the signing of the Vietnam-Soviet treaty of friendship and the subsequent capture of Cambodia. Even though the brutal Pol Pot regime was thoroughly unpopular and discredited due to its atrocities - most countries especially ASEAN states were alarmed by this swift invasion. The basic issue then involved was that could one country attack and capture another on the pretext of the unpopularity of its regime? (The issue resurfaced in Kosovo). China felt that it could not afford to leave Vietnam unpunished for this brazen affront. It had somehow to restore its credibility as the dominant military power in the region whose wishes could not be ignored or slighted. It also needed some Vietnamese prisoners to secure a release of its own "advisors" captured in Kampuchea. The stage was therefore set for the Sino-Vietnam war.
Chinese Preparations
Soviet Intelligence sources indicated that the Chinese politburo was split on the issue of attacking Vietnam. The factions headed by the then Vice Premier Deng Xiao Peng favoured a limited offensive to "teach a lesson" on the 1962 pattern. This split was confirmed by the fact that despite Party circular "forbidding any anti war statements", a poster appeared on the "Democracy wall" in Peking questioning the wisdom of China’s attack on "small Vietnam". The PLA had for years been involved in suppressing the excesses of the cultural revolution and restoring law and order. Its training and operational efficiency had clearly suffered as a result of this diversion. Within the PLA itself there were two schools of thought:
The pro Deng Xiao Peng faction which wanted China’s armed forces to be modernised and updated with the help of the West to enable it to fight a conventional war.
The Maoist faction felt that China should continue to rely upon a Peoples defensive war to defeat any aggression. The most important result of this Sino Vietnam War was to be the victory of the Deng faction and the onset of the four modernisations.
Diplomatic Offensive
China launched a virulent campaign denigrating Vietnam as the "Cuba of Asia" and a tool of Soviet hegemonism. It accused Vietnam of trying to form an Indo-Chinese confederation aimed against China and the other South East Asian countries. The then Vice Premier Deng Xiao Peng visited the United States of America where he openly talked of teaching a lesson to the Vietnamese. Media sources speculated that he had assured the Americans that it would only be a limited offensive to drive home to the Vietnamese that they would not be allowed to get away scot free. The Americans were delighted by this tough stance and may even have privately encouraged Deng to go ahead with this limited punitive mission. Deng subsequently also visited Japan with whom China had recently concluded the Sino-Japanese treaty of friendship. Diplomatically now China had laid the ground for its massive offensive to teach a lesson to the Vietnamese.
Mobilisation
Western Intelligence sources have indicated that it took the Chinese 90 days to complete total mobilisation and deployment for this offensive. This indicated a high state of peacetime readiness in the main China’s Third Field Army (its largest Field Army) and was incharge of this operation. The troops actually employed belonged to the 42nd Army (Kumming Military Region). Initially 17 divisions had been deployed. Subsequently this was build up to a total of 25 divisions (250,000 men).
Commanders
Gen Hsu Shih Yun (who had sheltered Vice Premier Deng Xiao Peng when he had been purged for the second time in 1976) was the overall commander of this operation. He was a "long marcher" and a member of the polit buro and had been a vocal supporter of Deng. Gen Yang Teh Chih. Hsu’s deputy Yang was in tactical control of the operations. He was also a "Long marcher" and was the Deputy Commander of the Chinese forces during the Korean War. He had then developed the tactics of infiltration and envelopment followed by mass attacks. He was chosen to lead the attack due to the similarity of the terrain to Korea and moved in to position only in Jan 1979. Due to his exploits in the Long March he had earned the title of the "ever victorious General".
Chinese Pattern of Operations
Western Intelligence sources had expected Yang to follow the Korean pattern of offensive involving infiltration and envelopment followed by mass attacks. But in this case, perhaps keeping in view the Vietnamese skill at similar tactics, the Chinese followed a curiously direct and frontal approach. Even in the Battle of Sela in 1962, Chinese infiltration parties had worked their way behind our lines between Sela and Bomdila before they launched the main offensive at the pass. However in Vietnam, the Chinese Infantry supported by tanks and intense Artillery barrages launched mass attacks against the passes in the first phase itself. The Chinese used the technique of the ‘Divergent Attack.’ (That is attack on a wide front with subsequent echelons converging on to aimed objectives in a series of multiple pincer hooks). The offensive thus could be divided into three phases:
Battle of the Passes,
Break out to divisional objectives (approx. 10 miles in depth),
Final breakout to capture provincial capitals.
Concept of Operations
On the face of it the Chinese offensive seemed to be based on a sheer frontal and direct approach relying upon the weight of numbers and fire power to hammer its way through. But keeping in view the limited Chinese objectives in terms of depth of penetration, the overall Chinese aim was perhaps to draw Vietnamese regular divisions in a "meat grinder" war. The main Chinese points of effort or thrust lines could be:
The Langson approach via the Friendship Pass is the traditional invasion route along Highway One. It is also the shortest route and the Chinese railhead of Pingsiang is very close to the border. As expected the main Chinese thrust took place along this route.
The Coastal approach ran via Mongcai along the coast and culminated at the Haiphong harbour.
The Red River approach followed the course of the Red River Valley. National Highway Two ran through this valley and the provincial capital of Laocai lay at its mouth.
The Black River approach ran along the course of the Black River Valley and led to Hanoi. The provincial capital of Laichu lay at its mouth. This was a very long and unlikely approach (unless the Chinese decided to attack via Laos and head straight for the Delta and the famous battlefield of Dien Bien Phu.
Subsidiary approaches led to the provincial capitals of Caobang and Hagiang and could serve to cut the lateral Highway Four which runs parallel to the border and links Highways One and Two.
These were the thrust lines available to the Chinese in case their aim was an all out offensive aimed at the capture of Hanoi. However in actual fact, the Chinese aimed at a broad and shallow penetration all along the front which would take them till the line of the lateral Highway Four which ran parallel to the border. In so doing they hoped to draw into battle and destroy/decimate the regular Vietnamese divisions, who they felt would be compelled to react forward for the defence of the provincial capitals and important communications centres. This would result in major battles of attrition and could form the meat grinder in which they hoped to chew up the regular Vietnamese Army and inflict heavy punishment. They also calculated that this massive attack from the North would force Vietnam to withdraw troops from Cambodia and thereby remove the pressure on the guerillas of Pol Pot.
Vietnamese Pattern of Operations
The Vietnamese saw through this trap. Since the Chinese were going to withdraw any way, they reasoned that it was pointless to commit their regular divisions very far forward. Accordingly they decided to hold the frontier with their Border Militia (some 150,000 strong), while five to seven of their regular divisions took up crescent shaped defences along Hanoi in two lines/tires. The first of these lines connected Tehbai on the Red River with Kuangteh on the East Coast. This deployment was viable even if the Chinese decided on a desperate gamble to capture Hanoi. Since the shape of North Vietnam is like a triangle (with the base along the border and the apex at Hanoi), such a defensive deployment in depth would enable the defender to correctly identify the centre of gravity or the main point of effort of the enemy and thereby permit the defender to suitably employ his reserves to block that thrust and launch counter attacks.
The Vietnamese Militia
The border militia that fought the entire battle was not an ill trained or second-rate force. It was roughly equivalent of our Border Security Force but its quality was far higher. It must also be noted that at that point in time Vietnamese forces (regular or militia) were the most combat hardened in the world. The Vietnamese soldier is an excellent marksman, an expert at camouflage and concealment and can literally dig for miles. He is fleet footed and very mobile and a tenacious fighter. The militia was organised into squads. The organisation of the squad was flexible and task oriented. Roughly a squad was the equivalent of our Infantry Company. It comprised of three sub squads (platoons). Each sub squad had its own Artillery Observation Post (OP) officer, reliable HF radio communications and squad support weapons. The squads holding the passes had Anti-Tank Sub Squads armed with the Soviet Snapper and Sagger missiles as also detachments trained in demolitions. Squad strengths were totally flexible and dependent on the task allotted. In many cases, parts of a squad would be holding ground while the other went forward for raids/ambushes.
Hanoi’s strategy therefore was to defend the border with a screen of 100,000 local militia troops employing guerilla tactics in a difficult hilly and densely wooded terrain that was admirably suited for such operations. In fact, French General Marcel Bigeamy called this region "Dante’s Inferno". The Main Force (regular) Vietnamese Divisions were held well back for a crescent shaped defence of the Hanoi plains. The densest missile defence in history defended Hanoi and Hai Phong itself. (It was the density of this missile defence that probably prompted the Chinese to keep out their Air Force). The Soviets moved in a Naval Flotilla to the South China Sea. Admiral Vladimir Maslov, the Commander of the Soviet Pacific fleet was himself located on the Flagship of this fleet, (which was crammed with sophisticated electronic gear for interception of signal communications and Electronic Warfare). Soviet reconnaissance aircraft were on constant patrol. However their effectiveness was curtailed due to dense cloud cover. The Soviets were closely monitoring the Chinese build up and military activity and keeping a close watch to see if the Chinese over stepped their stated brief of a limited war to just teach a lesson. The legendary Vo Nguen Giap was the nominal commander of the Vietnamese forces at that time. However it was rumoured that he was then suffering from Hodgekin’s disease and was too sick to be in charge of day to day operations. These were controlled by his protégé General Van Tien Dung, the man who had captured Saigon in 1975.
The Chinese Offensive
Divergent Attacks
On 17th Feb 1979, the Chinese attacked on 26 points along the 480 mile border. Initial penetrations were effected at 20 points. Subsequently four major thrust lines were developed towards the provincial capitals of Laocai, Caobang, Dong Dang and Long Son. After 17 days of very fierce fighting the Chinese managed to penetrate upto a depth of 30 to 40 kilometers and captured the provincial capitals of the northern provinces. The aim of capturing these border towns was to draw out and destroy the Vietnamese regular army formations in a classical war of attrition. The Vietnamese however refused to rise to this bait. The well-armed and superbly trained Vietnamese Border Militia that slowed down the Chinese offensive to a crawl contested the Chinese advance almost entirely. The average rate of advance varied from 1.7 to 2.3 kilometers per day. The battle can be studied in the following three phases:
Battle of the Passes (break in).
Break out to divisional objectives (15 to 20 kms in depth).
Break out and capture of the provincial capitals (30 to 40 kms in depth).
Battle of the Passes
As stated the Chinese had initially adopted the technique of the divergent attack. This colourful phraseology however only describes the standard technique of trying to mask the main thrust lines by launching a large number of initial attacks. From 26 initial points of attack the Chinese narrowed down to the four major thrust lines aimed at the provincial capitals. These main thrusts crystallized as under:
Along the Red River Valley towards the town of Lao Cai.
Towards National Highway Four aimed at the town of Hagiang.
From Chung Si in Yunan province towards the border town of Cao Bang.
Along the traditional invasion route via the "Friendship Pass" towards Lang Son and Dong Dang. This was the shortest thrust line towards Hanoi along National Highway One. Hanoi lay 135 kms to the south of Lang Son and had the Chinese decided to prosecute a full-scale war, this would probably have been their main thrust line.
Instead of adopting the Korean War pattern of Infiltration and Envelopment, the Chinese commander Yang Teh Chi launched massive frontal attacks spear-headed in most cases by tanks and supported by massive barrages of Artillery. The Chinese use of tanks in the hilly terrain came as a surprise. These were used primarily for bunker bursting. The Chinese aim was to initially capture border passes before undertaking any outflanking movement. The Chinese Infantry attacked in overwhelming strength supported by intense barrages of Artillery fire. In many cases the Vietnamese launched skillful spoiling attacks and ambushes across the border to disrupt and disorganise the Chinese assaults. Radio intercepts had probably given them a clear indication of the Chinese D-Day. The Chinese employed T-59 medium tanks in the assault role for bunker bursting and for carriage of ammunition and re org stores as also for spraying chemical weapons. The Vietnamese Militia Squads armed with anti tank missiles were able to destroy a large number of Chinese tanks. Thus 18 Chinese tanks led initial Chinese attacks at Muong Khoung. Of these 8 were blown off along with the bridge. To compound Chinese difficulties, the Vietnamese launched a number of cross border raids on the Chinese gun positions and were able to disrupt the fire support. The Chinese lacked APCs and casualty evacuation procedures failed to keep pace with the very heavy volume of initial casualties. Surprisingly the Chinese tanks and APCs used seemed to lack reliable radio communication and in many cases were seen using flag and hand signals. (This may also have been due to Electronic jamming by the Russians). The Chinese initial attacks were badly disrupted and disorganised by Vietnamese spoiling attacks and counter attacks, mine fields, sharpened bamboo stakes and very heavy artillery concentrations.
Break out to Divisional Objectives
After the first 5-7 days of intense fighting, the Chinese went in for their standard tactical cum logistics pause. The initial attacks had been badly mauled and disorganised. Yet the Chinese pressed on relentlessly. The initial 26 points of attack now converged on to 11 Pincers. 17 Infantry divisions supported by armour had launched the initial attacks. Eight fresh divisions were brought in and pressed through for subsequent phases. The Chinese had in most cases penetrated up to 10 miles (15-20 kms) but paid a very heavy price in personnel and equipment casualties. The tactical skill and finesse of the Korean War had been replaced by a steam roller advance spear-headed by tanks, preceded by intense artillery barrages and pressed home by waves after waves of Chinese Infantry.
The Battle of the Provincial Capitals
The Chinese now resumed their attacks aimed at the major provincial capitals and key communication centres in the border hinter land. Major battles developed at Cao Bang, Lang Son, Hang Lien Sen, Lai Chou and Quang Ninh. The aim of these attacks was to draw in the regular Vietnamese Army formations and inflict heavy attrition on them through classical "meat-grinder" operations. There were fierce attacks and counter attacks. In Lang Son the Chinese launched 17 counter attacks to regain one objective. By late last week of February, the Vietnamese had still not committed any of their regular divisions which were being held back for the defence of Hanoi. It had also not pulled out any of its 150,000 troops in Cambodia. In the provincial capital the Vietnamese adopted their favourite tactic. They withdrew from the towns into the adjoining hills. As the Chinese formations surged in they were engaged from all sides from the surrounding hills and quite severely mauled.
The Battle of Lang Son
The Chinese were quite dazed by the ferocity of the resistance. On paper however they had captured the provincial capitals. The Vietnamese had adopted the classical Dien Bien Phu defence by emptying the towns and climbing on to the surrounding hills. The Chinese now decided to call it a day. They announced their standard unilateral withdrawal. However to cover this withdrawal they launched a massive corps sized offensive against Lang Son. The three pronged attack was launched on 2 Mar 1979 even as most Chinese units in the rear had commenced withdrawal. Very fierce fighting erupted. The Vietnamese now committed their Flying Tigers Regt at Dong Dang. The 308th Infantry Division (an elite formation) was readied to intervene in the battle of Lang Son but not moved, as the Militia troops seemed to be handling the situation quite well. Having avoided a loss of face by "capturing" the provincial capitals, the Chinese announced that they had taught a lesson to Vietnam and staged their withdrawal. The Chinese had on ground captured four pockets of territory around the provincial capitals of Lao Cai, Cao Beng, Dong Dang and Lang Son. However (apart from a Regt) no Vietnamese main forces had been lured into the battle. 25 Chinese divisions of the Third Field Army had been quite severely mauled.
Chinese Casualties
After the war, Gen Wu Xiuquan, the Chinese Deputy Chief of the General Staff told a delegation from the Institute of Higher Studies for National Defence, France (led by Gen Andre Marte) that the Chinese Army had suffered 20,000 killed and wounded in this four week war. Taking a ratio of one killed to three wounded this almost translated into 7000 killed and 13-15000 wounded. This steep casualty figure surprised the Pentagon. The toll was higher than the US toll in any four weeks of the war in Vietnam. Considering that the Chinese used some 250,000 troops against 100,000 Vietnamese Militia the percentage of casualties is almost in the region of 8-10%. These comparatively high Chinese losses could be ascribed to the PLA doctrine of "coming to grips" with the enemy at the earliest opportunity. The Chinese believe that they have no equal in hand to hand fighting.
The Chinese had set out to teach a lesson to Vietnam. They ended up learning quite a few painful lessons themselves. The Sino-Vietnam War was used by the Deng Xiao Peng faction to argue that its stance for the urgent need for modernisation had been thoroughly vindicated. The war had painfully highlighted that the Chinese lacked modern equipment. In specific they had not used Armoured Personnel Carriers or Infantry Combat Vehicles. The PLA Air force was thoroughly antiquated and Gen Wu told Gen Andre Marte that it was at least 15 years behind the Western Air Forces. It had flown no combat sorties (except Air OP sorties) in the whole war – thereby making a virtue of necessity. Deng Xiao Peng used this war to conclusively win the doctrinal debate in China. He emerged as the Chinese strongman and great moderniser who initiated the ambitious programme of the ‘four modernisations’ that would set the Chinese civilisation firmly on the road to super power status within a span of 50 years. Deng eclipsed Mao and his Peoples’ war heritage. The painful lessons of the Sino-Vietnam War were used to drive home the need for modernisation. This formed the experimental backdrop to the transition from Peoples’ War to Peoples’ War under high tech conditions.
Conclusion
In conclusion the following facts about this war merit highlighting:
It lasted for less than three weeks (17 days). 250,000 Chinese troops of some 25 divisions were pitted against 100,000 Vietnamese troops of the Border Militia.
Either side did not employ air power.
The Vietnamese did not commit their regular (Main Force divisions) or withdraw any of their forces from Cambodia.
The Chinese suffered about 6-7000 killed and 13-15000 wounded. Details of Vietnamese casualties are not available.
The Chinese formations penetrated up to a maximum depth of 30-40 kms in four pockets. They captured three out of six provincial capitals and staged a unilateral withdrawal.
The withdrawal was covered by a Corps sized offensive in Lang Son.
Despite a quasi-nuclear backdrop, the war was kept limited to the conventional level. Nor did it lead to a wider clash between China and the USSR.
It was a classical limited conflict - limited in aim and scope, limited in space by the depth of penetration, limited in time. Resource limitation involved abjuring the use of Air Power. Knowing the Chinese weakness in this field, this amounted to making a virtue out of necessity. The PLAAF could have done little in this conflict and would have taken heavy and high profile losses.
The Vietnamese campaign in Cambodia in January the same year provided a study in contrast. It was limited only in the time dimension (one week). It achieved decisive results in as much as it over threw Pol Pot’s genocidal regime and led to the occupation of the whole of Cambodia. It was a classic Air-Land Campaign in the blitzkrieg mould.
Despite the constraints and limitations and its mixed results the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in Feb-Mar 1979 remains an apt illustration of the efficacy of the ‘Teach a Lesson’ model. The declaratory aim of just teaching a lesson serves to keep the war limited to the Border War Paradigm. It is a useful and viable escalation control mechanism in the context of the nuclear or quasi-nuclear backdrop.
Despite the declaratory aim of teaching a lesson, the Chinese maintained a degree of ambiguity till the very end. The holding back of the Vietnamese Main Force divisions till the Chinese intentions crystallised, highlights this aspect.
Vietnam attempted no counter offensives/strokes into Chinese territory (apart from small sized raids/ambushes) nor did it closely follow up the Chinese withdrawal and undertake any pursuit operations. It was content to let the Chinese forces withdraw undisturbed.
The Chinese combat performance however showed up a number of shortcomings in organisation, equipment and operating patterns. Apparently the Chinese have taken these lessons to heart.
The Two-Front Syndrome
The examples of the Sino-Vietnam and Vietnam-Cambodia wars of 1979 exemplify the response of highly militarised states to a "two front" situation. In late 1978 and early 1979 both China and Vietnam felt themselves being pushed into a two front situation. Vietnam felt it was being hemmed in by China in the North and an irredentist Pol Pot in Cambodia in the South. At home it had to deal with a large ethnic Chinese (Hoa) minority in South Vietnam. China in turn felt that the Soviet-Vietnam Treaty of Friendship was getting it encircled in a two front situation. The response of both these militarised states was highly proactive and decisive. They lashed out militarily before the perceived encirclement became a fact. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia is a classic example of a very high-risk operation with very tight time schedules but equally high pay offs. They pulled off this blitzkrieg in Jan 79 before China could complete its mobilisation in the North. The Chinese responded with their invasion in just a month’s time. American scholars like Bruce Elleman have stated that China’s invasion of Vietnam in Feb-Mar 1979 was primarily a response to the Soviet-Vietnam Treaty of Friendship. China wanted to demonstrate that it could not be deterred from the pursuit of its regional interests by any extra regional power and the Soviet treaty would be of no avail to Vietnam. In other words they wanted to call the Soviet bluff. Both these direct and forthright responses to the two front situations are highly instructive and merit detailed study and analysis. As a case study model the Sino-Vietnam War is a very significant military campaign that was fought against a quasi-nuclear backdrop. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia may be equally relevant to our context. Both limited wars are highly illustrative models and need to be studied in detail for lessons in the Indian context.

Select Bibliography
[1] Bruce Elleman, Sino-Soviet Relations and the Feb 1979 Sino-Vietnamese Conflict. (20 Apr 96).
[2] Christian. F. Ostermann, "New Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Border Dispute" Cold War International History Project Bulletin Issue 5 (Spring 1995).
[3] Ramesh Thakur and Carlyyle Thayer, Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam. New York. St Martin Press, 1992.
[4]King. C. Chen, "China’s War with Vietnam 1979. Stanford. C.A Hoover Institution Press 1987.
[5] Robert A Scalapino, The Political Influence of the USSR in Asia in Donald.S.Zagoria ed. Soviet Policy in East Asia. New Haven, Yale University Press 1982.
[6]] hang Pao-Min, Kampuchea between China and Vietnam (Singapore, Singapore University Press 1985).
[7] Richard H Solomon and Masatake Kosaka, (eds), The Soviet Far East Military Buildup (Dover,MA Auburn Home Publishing Co.1986).
[8] John Blodgett, "Vietnam : Soviet Pawn or Regional Power "? In Rodney.W. James "Emerging Powers: Defence and Security of the Third World" (New York, Praeger Publishers 1986).
[9] Banning Garrett, "The Strategic Triangle and the Indo China Crisis".In David.W.P.Ellicit ed. The Third Indo China Conflict (Boulder,Co.Westview Press. 1981).

网路闪电侠

Chiến tranh biên giới Việt - Trung, 1979
Nguyên nhân
Nhận thấy Việt Nam đưa quân vào Campuchia lật đổ chính quyền Khmer Đỏ trong cuộc chiến tranh giữa Việt Nam và Campuchia, Trung Quốc quyết định tấn công xâm lược Việt Nam với lý do "dạy cho Việt Nam một bài học" (lời Đặng Tiểu Bình) nhưng mục đích chính là phân chia lực lượng quân đội của Việt Nam để giúp chính quyền diệt chủng Khmer Đỏ. Đồng thời, Trung Quốc muốn thử nghiệm chiến thuật quân sự phòng thủ chủ động (active defense doctrine), đưa cuộc phòng thủ biên giới vào sâu lãnh thổ đối phương.
Ngoài ra, theo một số nhà nghiên cứu quân sự Tây phương, về mặt chiến lược, Trung Quốc thử nghiệm một cuộc chiến tranh biên giới có giới hạn để biểu lộ rõ khả năng tương trợ của Liên xô, sau khi Việt Nam gia nhập Comecon, và ký hiệp ước hữu nghị và hợp tác với Liên Xô (1978), trong đó có điều khoản về tương trợ quân sự . Nếu thảo ước này được tuân thủ nghiêm ngặt, theo nhận định của Quân ủy Trung ương Đảng Cộng sản Trung Quốc, nó sẽ là hiểm họa quốc phòng lớn vì đặt Trung Quốc vào tình thế lưỡng đầu thọ địch (two-front war) khi xảy ra chiến tranh với Việt Nam hoặc Liên Xô.
Tương quan lực lượng tham chiến
Để tiến công Việt Nam, Trung Quốc sử dụng 9 quân đoàn chủ lực và một số sư đoàn bộ binh độc lập (tổng cộng trên 30 sư đoàn), 6 trung đoàn xe tăng, 4 sư đoàn và nhiều trung đoàn pháo binh, phòng không. Lực lượng được huy động trên 400.000 binh sĩ, 550 xe tăng, 3.000 khẩu pháo, cối và dàn hỏa tiễn, chưa kể hơn 200 tàu chiến của hạm đội Nam Hải và 1.700 máy bay sẵn sàng phía sau. Tướng Hứa Thế Hữu, tư lệnh Đại Quân khu Quảng Châu chỉ huy hướng tiến công vào đông bắc Việt Nam với trọng điểm là Lạng Sơn và Cao Bằng. Tướng Dương Đắc Chí, tư lệnh Đại Quân khu Côn Minh đảm nhiệm hướng tây bắc với trọng điểm là Hoàng Liên Sơn (nay là Lào Cai).
Về phía Việt Nam, do phần lớn các quân đoàn chủ lực đang chiến đấu ở Campuchia nên phòng thủ ở biên giới với Trung Quốc chỉ có một số sư đoàn chính quy (chủ yếu là tân binh) của Quân khu 1 và 2 cùng các lực lượng vũ trang địa phương.
Sáng ngày 17 tháng 2 năm 1979, quân đội Trung Quốc tiến công trên toàn tuyến biên giới phía Bắc Việt Nam. Hướng Lạng Sơn có quân đoàn 43, 54, 55.
Hướng Cao Bằng có quân đoàn 41, 42, 50.
Hướng Hoàng Liên Sơn có quân đoàn 13, 14.
Hướng Lai Châu có quân đoàn 11.
Hướng Quảng Ninh, Hà Tuyên (nay là Hà Giang) mỗi nơi cũng có từ 1-2 sư đoàn.
Tất cả các hướng tấn công đều có xe tăng, pháo binh hỗ trợ. Không quân và hải quân không được sử dụng trong toàn bộ cuộc chiến.
Trong giai đoạn đầu đến ngày 28 tháng 2 năm 1979, quân Trung Quốc chiếm được các thị xã Lào Cai, Cao Bằng, Hà Giang và một số thị trấn. Các cơ sở vật chất, kinh tế ở những nơi này bị phá hủy triệt để. Tuy nhiên, do vấp phải sự phòng ngự kiên cường và có hiệu quả của Việt Nam nên quân Trung Quốc tiến rất chậm và bị thiệt hại nặng.
Quân Việt Nam còn phản kích đánh cả vào hai thị trấn biên giới Ninh Minh (thuộc tỉnh Quảng Tây) và Malypo (thuộc tỉnh Vân Nam) của Trung Quốc.
Ngày 19 tháng 2 năm 1979, nhóm cố vấn quân sự cao cấp của Liên Xô tới Hà Nội để gặp các tướng lĩnh chỉ huy của Việt Nam. Moskva yêu cầu Trung Quốc rút quân. Liên Xô cũng viện trợ gấp vũ khí cho Việt Nam qua cảng Hải Phòng, đồng thời dùng máy bay vận tải để chuyển một số sư đoàn chủ lực Việt Nam từ Campuchia về.
Trong giai đoạn sau, cả hai bên đều tăng cường thêm lực lượng và cuộc chiến tiếp tục, trong đó gay go nhất là hướng Lạng Sơn. Tại đây sư đoàn bộ binh 3 Sao Vàng, một đơn vị thiện chiến của Việt Nam từng qua đánh Mỹ cùng một số sư đoàn khác đã tổ chức phòng thủ chu đáo. Sau nhiều trận đánh ác liệt, quân Trung Quốc vào được thị xã Lạng Sơn chiều ngày 4 tháng 3 năm 1979. Ngày 5 tháng 3 năm 1979, Việt Nam ra lệnh tổng động viên toàn quốc. Đồng thời phía Việt Nam cũng điều các quân đoàn chủ lực có xe tăng, pháo binh hỗ trợ áp sát mặt trận, chuẩn bị phản công giải phóng các khu vực bị chiếm đóng.
Cũng trong ngày 5 tháng 3 năm 1979,do áp lực của Liên Xô, sự phản đối của quốc tế, đồng thời cũng đã chiếm được các thị xã lớn của Việt Nam ở biên giới, Bắc Kinh tuyên bố hoàn thành mục tiêu chiến tranh và bắt đầu rút quân. Mặc dù chiến sự vẫn tiếp diễn ở một số nơi nhưng đến ngày 18 tháng 3 năm 1979 quân Trung Quốc đã hoàn tất rút khỏi Việt Nam.

Kết quả cuộc chiến
Theo tuyên bố của phía Trung Quốc: quân Trung Quốc có 6.900 người chết, 14.800 người bị thương và 240 người bị bắt. Quân Việt Nam có 60.000 người chết và bị thương, 1.600 người bị bắt.
Theo tuyên bố của phía Việt Nam: quân Trung Quốc có 62.500 người chết và bị thương, tổn thất 280 xe tăng, 115 khẩu pháo cối và 270 xe quân sự. Phía Việt Nam có hàng nghìn dân thường chết và bị thương, không có số liệu về tổn thất của các lực lượng vũ trang.
Cuộc chiến cũng đã gây ra những thiệt hại nặng nề về kinh tế cho Việt Nam : 4/4 thị xã bị hủy diệt hoàn toàn, 320/320 xã, 735/904 trường học, 428/430 bệnh viện, bệnh xá, 41/41 nông trường, 38/42 lâm trường, 81 xí nghiệp, hầm mỏ và 80.000 ha hoa màu bị tàn phá, 400.000 gia súc bị giết và bị cướp. Khoảng một nửa trong số 3,5 triệu dân bị mất nhà cửa, tài sản và phương tiện sinh sống.
Về mặt lâu dài, nó mở đầu cho hơn 10 năm căng thẳng trong quan hệ và xung đột vũ trang dọc biên giới giữa hai quốc gia, buộc Việt Nam phải thường xuyên duy trì một lực lượng quân sự khổng lồ dọc biên giới, gây hậu quả xấu đến nền kinh tế. Sinh hoạt và sản xuất của người dân vùng biên giới bị ảnh hưởng nghiêm trọng. Ngoài ra, nhiều cột mốc biên giới cũng bị quân Trung Quốc phá hủy, gây khó khăn cho việc hoạch định biên giới sau này.
Các nhà quan sát phương Tây nhận định như sau:
Về mặt chiến thuật, Trung Quốc thất bại vì tuy Việt Nam chưa kịp đưa các đơn vị ở Campuchia về tham chiến mà quân Trung Quốc vẫn chịu tổn thất nặng.
Về mặt chiến lược, Trung Quốc thành công vì đã chứng minh rõ bản chất không thật của hiệp ước tương trợ quân sự giữa Liên Xô và Việt Nam, và đã chứng minh khả năng lưỡng đầu thọ địch sẽ không xảy ra. Cũng có một số nhà quan sát cho rằng Quân ủy Trung ương Đảng Cộng sản Trung Quốc lúc bấy giờ có hai khuynh hướng, một thiên về Đặng Tiểu Bình, người muốn cải tổ quân sự trong toàn bộ chiến lược cải cách Trung Quốc, và một chống đối lại cải tổ. Tài liệu phương Tây cho rằng tai hại chiến lược to lớn nhất cho Việt Nam là cuộc chiến này đưa đến việc phe cải tổ thắng thế: Trung Quốc dồn sức hiện đại hóa các đơn vị chủ lực và đã thành công. Điều này sẽ thấy rõ sau này trong Chiến tranh biên giới Việt Trung 1984-1988, khi Việt Nam gặp rất nhiều khó khăn.
Sau khi Liên Xô tan rã, đến năm 1992 quan hệ giữa hai nước mới được bình thường hóa.
Tham khảo
Lưu Văn Lợi (1997), Ngoại giao Việt Nam
Nguyen Huu Thuy (1979), Chinese Aggression : How and Why it failed
NXB QĐND (1980), Sư đoàn Sao Vàng
"Sino-Soviet Relations and the February 1979 Sino-Vietnamese Conflict", Bruce Elleman, Tài liệu thư khố Trung tâm Nghiên cứu Chiến tranh Việt Nam, Texas Tech University [1]
"The Sino-Vietnam War-1979: Case Studies in Limited Wars" Colonel G.D. Bakshi, Bharat Rakshak Monitor - Volume 3(3) November-December 2000
Lấy từ

共和热血

其实战争就是国内矛盾和国际矛盾不可调和的产物，是政治的暴力选择。